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This paper presents a sequential solution method to discover eﬃcient trades in an electricity market 
model. The market model represents deregulated electricity market consisting of four types of partici- 
pants: independent power producers, retailers, public utilities, and consumers. Our model is based on 
graph theory, and the market participants are denoted by a network composes of three types of agents 
including sellers, buyers, and traders. The market participants have different capacity and demand of 
electricity from each other, and each electricity trade should satisfy the capacity and demand. Our se- 
quential solution method can discover eﬃcient electricity trades satisfying the constraints regarding ca- 
pacity and demand by utilizing network ﬂow. Simulation results demonstrate the eﬃciency of electricity 
trades determined by our method by examining social welfare, which is the total of payoffs of all mar- 
ket participants. Furthermore, the simulation results also indicate the allocation of payoff to each market 
participant. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 
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2. Introduction 
Over decades, structural change from regulated electricity mar-
ets to competitive electricity markets has emerged in many coun-
ries. For ensuring safe electricity supply ﬁrst, regulated electric-
ty markets with centralized structure in which there are a few
uppliers have been developed. However, some issues on electric-
ty prices in the markets have arisen due to the centralized struc-
ure [1,2] . First, consumers cannot realize whether current electric-
ty prices are appropriate or not. Second, electricity suppliers in
he centralized markets do not seem to reduce electricity prices.
hus, these issues have pushed for the deregulation of electricity
arkets. 
Deregulated electricity markets have various types of partici-
ants compared to the regulated markets. For example, the par-
icipants are classiﬁed as public utilities, independent power pro-
ucers, electricity retailers, and consumers [3] . These participants
ake the structure of markets more complicated. Hence, the previ-
us method to examine the characteristics of the centralized mar-
ets cannot be applied to the deregulated markets. Nevertheless,
haracteristics regarding the deregulated markets should be exam-∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: ryo_hase.0428@icloud.com (R. Hase), shinomi@ieee.org (N. 
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or the deregulation caused California electricity crisis in 2001 [4] . 
.1. Related works 
Numerous studies have been conducted to consider modeling
echniques for deregulated electricity markets [5,6] . Grine et al.
resent a multi-layer model to consider electricity prices with an-
ther energy commodity [7] . Triki et al. consider an optimal capac-
ty allocation problem to maximize proﬁts of electricity sellers [8] .
ussein et al. formulate an optimization problem for forecasting
rices in day-ahead electricity markets [9] . Corchero et al. present
 stochastic programming model for the Spanish electricity market
10] . 
Moreover, there are various studies on eﬃciency , which means
he optimal allocation of the electricity with appropriate prices
11] . Eﬃciency can be measured by social welfare that is the sum
f payoffs of all market participants [12] . Stern et al. consider the
elation between market clearing price mechanisms and the maxi-
ization of social welfare in deregulated electricity markets [13] .
echanism designs to maximize social welfare in double-sided
lectricity markets are presented in [14,15] . Nicolaisen et al. pro-
ose a price setting problem in a double-price auction for whole-
ale markets by implementing a reinforcement learning algorithm
16] . Swami considers social welfare maximization with consider-nder the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 
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Fig. 1. Tripartite network G composed of agents. 
Fig. 2. Splittable ﬂow. 
Fig. 3. Unsplittable ﬂow. 
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iing congestion of transmission lines [17] . As one of the research
topics on market eﬃciency, network market based on graph the-
ory is proposed in [18] . This model is considered to be more re-
alistic than anonymous networks because actual trades occur be-
tween participants that can interact with each other. Since electric-
ity trades also take place between participants connected by trans-
mission lines, we proposed an algorithm to ﬁnd optimal matchings
in an electricity market model based on network market [19] . 
However, the previous works have not focused on electricity re-
tailers, because the previous market models contain only suppliers
and consumers, not a retailer. In [20] , Babic notes advantages of
an agent-based modeling technique for electricity retail markets;
however, no characteristics regarding retailers are demonstrated
in the paper. To model activities of retailers in network markets,
Kleinberg et al. considers optimal price setting on a tripartite graph
by utilizing a game theoretical approach [21] . However, the method
cannot deal with a multi-unit commodity such as electricity be-
cause it is assumed that participants trade only a single-unit com-
modity. Besides, Nava introduces the competition model utilizing
network ﬂows in oligopolistic markets [22] . Even though the model
of Nava can cope with participants including retailers dealing with
multi-unit commodities, the role of each participant is eventually
determined by equilibrium in the model. Hence, the model cannot
be applied to electricity markets because the roles of participants
in electricity markets are determined before equilibrium prices are
discovered. 
1.2. Contribution 
This paper proposes a sequential solution method to determine
prices and eﬃcient trades in an electricity market model with elec-
tricity retailers. In this paper, we formulated a determination prob-
lem for eﬃcient electricity trades on a model with electricity as a
multi-unit commodity, not a single-unit commodity. To solve the
problem, we constructed the sequential solution method to choose
electricity trades in the market model. In our solution method,
a price setting algorithm extended from a price setting mecha-
nism proposed in [21] . Moreover, to determine electricity trades
on the model, a determination problem is formulated by utilizing
integer programming and unsplittable ﬂow [23] . Simulation results
demonstrate the characteristics in deregulated electricity markets
about eﬃciency in terms of social welfare and payoff allocation of
each market participant. Although the simulation results about ef-
ﬁciency are similar to the result presented in [24] , the parame-
ter conditions about capacity of electricity sellers are different in
this paper. Moreover, the results regarding payoff allocation indi-
cate that important factors for the payoff allocation are the market
structure and the period of time having elapsed since the deregu-
lation. 
1.3. Paper structure 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 proposes our elec-
tricity market model with agents. In Section 3 , a price setting game
on the model is introduced. Section 4 presents overall procedure to
determine electricity trades. Section 5 explains market participants
assigned to our model. Section 6 demonstrates simulation results,
and Section 7 concludes this paper. 
2. Electricity market model with agents 
This section introduces our electricity market model based on
graph theory. The model denotes three types of agents and elec-
tricity trades conducted between them. .1. Tripartite network representing electricity markets 
Our electricity market model is represented by tripartite net-
ork G = (S ∪ B ∪ T , A ) . Fig. 1 shows an example of G. G is com-
osed of three types of agents: buyer b j ∈ B, seller s i ∈ S , and trader
 k ∈ T . Each arc indicates that agents at endpoints of the arc can
onduct electricity trades between them. Arc set A contains arcs
 s i , t k ) or ( t k , b j ) due to following three constraints. 
1. Each arc connects two agents not belonging to the same type
of agents. 
2. b j must be provided electricity from t k . 
3. t k must purchase electricity from s i . 
.2. Notation of electricity ﬂow on market model 
In the model, each seller has a capacity of electricity, and each
uyer has a demand of electricity. The capacity of s i and the de-
and of b j are denoted by c 
s 
i 
and d b 
j 
respectively. Let c min be the
inimum capacity of all c s 
i 
, and let d min be the minimum demand
f all b j . Since a seller in our model can supply electricity to at
east one buyer via a trader, c min must satisfy c min ≥ d min . 
To denote electricity trades in the model, the notation of net-
ork ﬂow is utilized. Integer x ( b, a ) is the quantity of electricity
ow on arc ( b, a ). Lower bound and upper bound of x ( b, a ) are
epresented by lb ( b, a ) and ub ( b, a ), respectively. If x ( b, a ) > 0, elec-
ricity currents on ( b, a ); otherwise, there is no electricity ﬂow on
 b, a ). 
In addition, unsplittable ﬂow is utilized to avoid determining
omplicated electricity trades satisfying the demand of a buyer. In
igs. 2 and 3 , solid arcs represent electricity ﬂow to satisfy d b 
3 
. Elec-
ricity ﬂow in Fig. 2 is considered as splittable ﬂow . The type of
ow in Fig. 3 is called unsplittable ﬂow. Only one s 2 − b 3 path is
elected as unsplittable ﬂow, and splittable ﬂow adversely needs
 larger number of arcs than unsplittable ﬂow. Hence, our model
ses unsplittable ﬂow to determine electricity trades with a simple
tructure. 
Unsplittable ﬂow is realized by ﬂow constraints on the model. s i 
an supply electricity ﬂow up to c s 
i 
. There is no electricity ﬂow if s i 
oes not trade any electricity. Hence, lb(s i , t k ) = 0 , and ub(s i , t k ) =
 
s 
i 
. Besides, b j purchases d j units of electricity, and ﬂow constraints
n ( t k , b j ) are denoted by lb(t k , b j ) = d b j and ub(t k , b j ) = d b j . Fig. 4
ndicates these capacity constraints. 
R. Hase, N. Shinomiya / Operations Research Perspectives 3 (2016) 59–66 61 
Fig. 4. Flow constraints on arcs in G . 
Fig. 5. Ask and bid prices. 
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Fig. 6. Trade value and payoffs of agents. 
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A. Price setting game on market model 
Agents in the model have property called valuation and payoff.
he property is utilized in mechanisms for determining eﬃcient
lectricity trades. 
.1. Valuation and trade value 
Electricity prices offered by traders are determined by a price
etting game. Each seller and buyer in the model has valuation ,
hich describes the utility for trading one unit of electricity. v b 
j 
ndicates the valuation of b j for purchasing one unit of electricity.
 
s 
i 
denotes the valuation of s i for supplying one unit of electricity.
he sets of each valuation are deﬁned by 
 s = 
{
v s i | s i ∈ S, v s i > 0 
}
, v b = 
{
v b j | b j ∈ B, v b j > 0 
}
. 
Electricity trades occur between seller s i and buyer b j via trader
 k . About the electricity trades among them, each agent obtains
ayoff. The total of the payoff regarding the trade is called trade
alue . Since we assume that costs for supplying electricity through
rcs between s i and b j are zero regardless of t k , trade value for d 
b 
j 
nits of electricity is described by 
 i, j = 
(
v b j − v s i 
)
d b j . (1) 
When t k conducts a trade between b j and s i , t k has its own
trategy denoted by ( αk, j , βk, i ). This strategy consists of two types
f prices called ask price αk, j and bid price βk, i . t k offers αk, j to b j 
djacent to t k . Besides, βk, i is offered to s i adjacent to t k . In Fig. 5 ,
 k offers αk, j to b j and βk, i to s i . Since there will be traders who
ost money if βk, i > αk, j , the strategy of t k must be a no-crossing
trategy [25] represented by βk, i ≤ αk, j . 
.2. Payoff of each participant 
b j must purchase d 
b 
j 
units of electricity from one of the traders
o satisfy its demand. The total payoff of b j for purchasing electric-
ty from t k is represented by 
 
(
b j 
)
= 
(
v b j − αk, j 
)
d b j . (2) 
About sellers, s i is offered βk, i by t k . To provide electricity, s i 
ill choose t k offering βk, i that maximizes payoff of s i . Payoff of s i 
or supplying d b 
j 
units of electricity to b j through t k is denoted by
p 
(
s i , ( k, j ) 
)
= 
(
βk,i − v s i 
)
d b j . (3)
 i can provide electricity to one or more buyers if the total of de-
ands do not exceed c s 
i 
. Therefore, s i can obtain the total payoff
epresented by 
 ( s i ) = 
∑ 
(t k ,b j ) ∈ pair(s i ) 
p 
(
s i , ( k, j ) 
)
, (4)
here pair ( s i ) denotes the set of pairs of b j and t k provided elec-
ricity from s . i t k obtains payoff for trading d 
b 
j 
units of electricity between s i 
nd b j , which is denoted by 
p 
(
t k , ( i, j ) 
)
= 
(
αk, j − βk,i 
)
d b j . (5)
et S ( t k ) be the set of s i adjacent to t k , and let B ( t k ) be the set of
 j adjacent to t k . The total payoff of t k is represented by 
 ( t k ) = 
∑ 
s i ∈ S(t k ) ,b j ∈ B (t k ) 
p 
(
t k , ( i, j ) 
)
x k,i, j . (6)
ig. 6 shows the relation between the trade value and payoffs of s i ,
 k , and b j . 
. Procedure to determine electricity trades 
To determine electricity trades on the model, we propose a se-
uential solution method. The method ﬁrstly calculates equilib-
ium electricity prices, and then the method determines electricity
rades by using the prices. 
.1. Price setting algorithm 
Algorithm 1 shows a price setting algorithm that calculates
quilibrium prices. In this algorithm, each seller and buyer discov-
rs its maximum payoff for trading electricity by considering the
lgorithm 1 Price setting ( G , v s , v b , μ). 
for j ← 1 to | B | do 
if | adj(b j ) | = 1 then 
q (b j ) = 0 . 
else 
Find ˆ si with the minimum valuation ˆ vs i . 
q (b j ) = (v b j − ˆ vs i ) μ. 
while q (b j ) = (v b j − v´ s i ) μ ( ´s i  = ˆ si , ´v s i ≥ ˆ vs i ) do 
Decrease q (b j ) . 
end while 
end if 
end for 
for i ← 1 to | S| do 
if | adj(s i ) | = 1 then 
q (s i ) = 0 . 
else 
Find ˆ b j with the maximum valuation ˆ vb j . 
q (s i ) = ( ˆ vb j − v s i ) μ. 
while q (s i ) = ( ´v b j − v s i ) μ ( b´ j  = ˆ b j , ´v b j ≤ ˆ vb j ) do 
Increase q (s i ) . 
end while 
end if 
end for 
for k ← 1 to | T | do 
return αk, j = v b j − q (b j ) (b j ∈ B (t k )) . 
return βk,i = v s i + q (s i ) (s i ∈ S(t k )) . 
end for 
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 valuation of the other agents. This algorithm is based on price set-
ting mechanism explained in [21] . We extend the algorithm to ad-
just payoffs of participants for ensuring no participant exclusively
obtains larger payoff than other agents. 
The process of Algorithm 1 is as follows. First, each buyer b j ∈
B calculates q ( b j ), which is the payoff of b j for trading one unit of
electricity. q ( b j ) is used to obtain ask prices αk, j . For all a ∈ S ∪ B ,
let adj ( a ) be the set of t k connected to a . If | adj(b j ) = 1 | , there is
only one trader t k adjacent to b j . There is no competition between
b j and t k in this case, and thus q (b j ) = 0 . If | adj ( b j ) > 1|, two or
more traders t k are connected to b j . Let ˆ si be a seller adjacent to
t k ∈ adj ( b j ). ˆ si has the valuation ˆ vs i that is the minimum in the
valuation of sellers adjacent to t k ∈ adj ( b j ). In our price setting al-
gorithm, a real number μ (0 < μ ≤ 0.5) is incorporated into the
algorithm as a parameter that is used to adjust payoffs of sellers
and buyers. The range of μ is set to realize the no-crossing strat-
egy, explained in Section 3.1 . With this notation, q ( b j ) is ﬁrstly set
as q (b j ) = (v b j − ˆ vs i ) μ. Then, q ( b j ) is decreased until q ( b j ) becomes
equal to (v b 
j 
− v´ s 
i 
) μ, where s´ i  = ˆ si is one of the sellers adjacent to
t k ∈ adj ( b j ) and has valuation v´ s i ≥ ˆ vs i . 
Second, each seller s i ∈ S determines q ( s i ), which is the payoff
of s i for trading one unit of electricity. By setting q ( s i ), bid prices
βk, i can be determined. The process to set q ( s i ) is similar to the
process to calculate q ( b j ). If | adj(s i ) = 1 | , there is no competition
between s i and t k , and q (s i ) = 0 . If | adj ( s i ) > 1|, let ˆ b j be a seller
adjacent to t k ∈ adj ( s i ), and ˆ b j has the valuation ˆ vb j that is the max-
imum in the valuation of buyers adjacent to t k ∈ adj ( s i ). q ( s i ) is
ﬁrstly set as q (s i ) = ( ˆ vb j − v s i ) μ. Then, q ( s i ) is increased until q ( s i )
becomes equal to ( ´v b 
j 
− v s 
i 
) μ, where b´ j  = ˆ b j is one of the buyers
adjacent to t k ∈ adj ( s i ) and has valuation v´ b j ≤ ˆ vb j . 
Finally, ask price αk, j and bid price βk, i of each trader t k are set
based on q ( b j ) and q ( s i ) for all b j and s i . These ask and bid prices
ﬁnally determined are equilibrium prices on the market model. 
4.2. Optimization problem for trade determination 
4.2.1. Maximization of payoff for each trader 
To determine electricity trades, each trader solves a maximiza-
tion problem of payoff by using prices calculated by Algorithm 1 .
In this problem, trades are greedily chosen by each trader to max-
imize its payoff. This problem is formulated as an integer program
similar to the generalized assignment problem [26] . 
The maximization problem is formulated as follows. Let x k, i, j ∈
[0, 1] denote the electricity trades on s i − b j path via t k . x k,i, j = 1
means electricity trades are conducted on the s i − b j path. Ad-
versely, trades on the s i − b j path is not conducted if x k,i, j = 0 . The
condition of network ﬂow on the model determines x k, i, j , and the
condition is represented by 
x k,i, j = 
{
1 (x (s i , t k ) > 0 ∩ x (t k , b j ) > 0) , 
0 (x (s i , t k ) = 0 ∪ x (t k , b j ) = 0) . 
By using x k, i, j and p ( t k , ( i, j )), the maximization problem of t k is
described as the following integer program. 
max P (t k ) = 
∑ 
s i ∈ S(t k ) , b j ∈ B (t k ) 
0 ≤ x k,i, j ≤ 1 , 
p(t k , (i, j)) ≥ 0 , ∑ 
b j ∈ B (t k ) x k,i, j d 
b 
j 
≤ c s 
i 
. 
p(t k , (i, j)) x k,i, j . (7)
In (7) , x k,i, j = 1 means trades on s i − b j path are selected to
maximize payoff of t . k .2.2. Trades satisfying all capacity and demand 
Even though every trader determines all trades by (7) , demands
or some sellers might exceed their own capacity. This situation
eans some consumers cannot purchase electricity from a seller
ho does not have enough capacity to satisfy all demands. Hence,
lectricity trades satisfying all capacity and demand should be in-
ependently chosen from the electricity trades which each trader
elected by solving (7) . To choose the electricity trades consider-
ng capacity, a maximization problem of social welfare is utilized
n this paper. 
To describe the maximization problem, a maximum unsplit-
able ﬂow problem is utilized. In the problem, bipartite network
 bi = (S ∪ B, A bi ) is constructed. Arc set A bi corresponds to the set
f possible trades x t . Thus, for all t k ∈ T, A bi contains ( s i , b j ) if
 k,i, j = 1 in (7) . The capacity of ﬂow on ( s i , b j ) is denoted by 0
x i, j ≤ 1. s i can supply ﬂow up to c s i , and demand of ﬂow of b j 
s d b 
j 
. Finally, the following integer program gives W ( x t ) that is the
aximum social welfare on G bi . 
ax W (x t ) = 
∑ 
(s i , b j ) ∈ A bi 
x i, j ≤ 0 , ∑ 
s i ∈ adj(b j ) x i, j ≤ 1 , ∑ 
b j ∈ adj(s i ) x i, j d 
b 
j 
≤ c s 
i 
. 
x i, j w i, j . (8)
.3. Overall procedure for trade determination 
The overall procedure of our solution method to determine ef-
cient trades is described in Procedure 1. First, equilibrium prices
re calculated by Algorithm 1 . Then, every trader discovers trades
aximizing payoff of the trader. After that, eﬃcient trades x t will
e determined in all trades that the traders want to conduct. Fi-
ally, social welfare W ( x t ) can be calculated. 
Procedure 1 trade determination 
Input: G, v s , v b , μ. 
Output: W (x t ) , x t , . 
Four steps of the procedure: 
1. Price setting ( G, v s , v b , μ). 
2. For all t k , determine x k,i, j (s i ∈ S(t k ) , b j ∈ B (t k )) by (7) . 
3. Construct G bi by using x k,i, j (t k ∈ T, s i ∈ S, b j ∈ B ) . 
4. Obtain W (x t ) and x t by solving (8) with G bi . 
. Four types of participants assigned to model 
By setting conditions of the network and agents in the model,
our types of market participants can be considered. Those partic-
pants can be utilized to reveal characteristics of deregulated elec-
ricity markets. 
.1. Participants in deregulated electricity markets 
In this paper, a day-ahead electricity market is focused on as
eregulated electricity markets. Prices in the day-ahead markets
re determined hourly or half hourly [27] . Participants supposed
n this paper are classiﬁed into four types: the public utility, in-
ependent power producers, retailers, and consumers. The partici-
ants are described by agents explained in Section 2.1 . 
1. Public utility ( PU ) conducts electricity generation and supply.
The PU is a large ﬁrm that has conducted generation and sup-
ply since the market was regulated. In the deregulated market,
the PU can purchase electricity from another generator. The PU
is denoted by a pair of seller and trader. 
R. Hase, N. Shinomiya / Operations Research Perspectives 3 (2016) 59–66 63 
Fig. 7. prob (R , C) = 0 . 2 . 
Fig. 8. prob (R , C) = 0 . 8 . 
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Table 1 
Payoff of market participants and agents. 
Participant Agent Payoff of participant 
PU s i and t k P (P U) = P(s i ) + P(t k ) . 
R s i and t k P(R ) = P(s i ) + P(t k ) . 
IPP s i P (IP P ) = P(s i ) . 
C b j P(C) = P(b j ) . 
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s2. Retailer ( R ) conducts electricity trades with consumers. A re-
tailer is described by one pair of a trader and a seller if the
retailer has its own generator. Otherwise, one trader denotes a
retailer. 
3. Independent power producer ( IPP ) has its own generator to sell
its electricity to customers. An IPP is assigned to one of the sell-
ers, and it can supply electricity to PU and retailers. 
4. Consumer ( C ) is an end-user of electricity. A consumer pur-
chases electricity from one of the best suppliers connected to
the consumer. The consumer is assigned to one of the buyers. 
.2. Constraints on network structure 
To describe market participants, network G is constructed with
ollowing constraints. G has only one PU, and PU is connected to
ll consumers in G since PU existed in an electricity market be-
ore deregulation. The market model contains some IPP and retail-
rs that have newly joined the market after deregulation. For sim-
licity, the model contains the same number of IPP and retailers.
ach IPP is connected to all retailers and PU. 
After the deregulation, a consumer cannot choose a retailer if
he consumer does not know the retailer. To describe this situation,
 is connected to C with the probability represented by prob ( R,
 ) ∈ (0, 1]. If prob(R, C) = 1 , all arcs between retailers and a con-
umer are constructed. As the time has elapsed since the deregu-
ation, each consumer will increase the number of retailers which
he consumer know. Hence, long time has passed since the deregu-
ation if prob ( R, C ) is high. Figs. 7 and 8 show example models with
prob(R, C) = 0 . 2 and prob(R, C) = 0 . 8 , respectively. In these ﬁgures,
 
′ and R denote seller s i and trader t k of a retailer respectively.
esides, PU ′ and PU represent s i and t k of PU respectively in the
gures. 
.3. Constraints on parameters of participants 
The capacity of newly joining participants, such as IPP and re-
ailers, is relatively lower than the capacity of PU in deregulated
lectricity markets. The capacity of PU is enough to supply electric-
ty to all consumers since PU was responsible for electricity supply
efore deregulation. In this paper, capacity of sellers is set accord-
ng to the following constraint. 
 R ≤ c IPP ≤ c PU . (9) 
With regard to valuation of sellers, newly joining participants
ave lower valuation than PU in this paper. This condition means
ewly joining participants can offer low-cost electricity than PU.
esides, valuation of all buyers is ﬁxed to the same value for sim-
licity. The valuation of buyers is enough to purchase electricityrom any sellers. Following constraint indicates the conditions de-
cribed above. 
 R < v IPP < v PU < v C . (10)
.4. Metrics indicating characteristics of markets 
To evaluate trades determined by our method, two kinds of the
etrics are considered in this paper. 
.4.1. Eﬃciency rate 
Although W ( x t ) is the maximum social welfare on G bi , W ( x t )
oes not necessarily correspond to W ( x ) that is the upper bound
f social welfare on G. W ( x ) can be obtained by constructing bi-
artite network G ′ 
bi 
= (S ∪ B, A ′ 
bi 
) from G . A ′ 
bi 
is the set of possible
rades x on G ′ 
bi 
. If s i can trade with b j through at least one trader in
 , arc set A ′ 
bi 
contains an arc ( s i , b j ). With G 
′ 
bi 
, the following integer
rogram gives W ( x ). 
ax W (x ) = 
∑ 
(s i , b j ) ∈ A ′ bi 
0 ≤ x i j ≤ 1 , 
w i, j ≥ 0 , ∑ 
b j ∈ B x i, j d 
b 
j 
≤ c s 
i 
. 
x i, j w i, j . (11)
W ( x t ) is not necessarily the same as W ( x ) since the calculation
f W ( x ) does not consider electricity price setting. However, the
ifference between W ( x t ) and W ( x ) should be small to keep high
ﬃciency. Hence, the performance regarding eﬃciency of our se-
uential method can be evaluated by comparing W ( x t ) with W ( x ).
he comparison between W ( x t ) and W ( x ) can be conducted by ex-
mining Eﬃciency Rate (ER), such that 
R (x t , x ) = { W (x t ) /W (x ) } × 100 [%] . (12)
.4.2. Payoff rate 
In regulated electricity markets, PU is responsible for provid-
ng electricity to consumers. Hence, PU exclusively obtains payoff
or supplying electricity. On the other hand, payoff for providing
lectricity is also allocated to newly joining market participants in
eregulated electricity markets. Therefore, it is important to an-
lyze who can acquire how much payoff to trade electricity in
eregulated electricity markets. 
In this paper, Payoff Rate (PR) is utilized to indicate the rate of
ayoff of each participant in social welfare. The payoff of each par-
icipant can be described by using the payoff of agents. Table 1
hows the relation between the payoff of each participant and
gents. In Table 1 , P ( a ) denotes payoff of market participant a ∈
 PU ∪ R ∪ IPP ∪ C ). PR for a is denoted by 
 R (a ) = 
{
P (a ) /W (x t ) 
}
× 100 [%] . (13)
. Experimental results 
This section demonstrates simulation results of our sequential
olution method. After simulation conditions are introduced, re-
ults regarding eﬃciency rate and payoff rate are presented. 
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Table 2 
Conditions of parameters in simulations. 
Parameter Assigned value 
# of agents | S | = 5 or 7, | T | = 3 or 5, | B | = 10,15, or 30. 
# of participants (| S | = 5) PU: 1, R: 2, IPP: 2, C : 10, 15, or 30. 
# of participants (| S | = 7) PU: 1, R: 4, IPP: 4, C : 10, 15, or 30. 
v b 
j 
20 for all b j . 
v s 
i 
(| S| = 5) v s 1 = 10 , v s 2 = 4 , v s 3 = 3 , v s 4 = 9 , v s 5 = 8 . 
v s 
i 
(| S| = 7) v s 1 = 10 , v s 2 = 4 , v s 3 = 3 , v s 4 = 2 , v s 5 = 9 , v s 6 = 8 , v s 7 = 7 . 
d b 
j 
d b 
j 
= j. 
μ 0.25 
prob ( R, C ) 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0. 
Iteration 100 
Table 3 
Capacity pattern (| B | = 10 , 15 , 30) . 
| B | 10 
CP 1 2 3 4 5 
PU 55 55 55 55 55 
IPP 3 6 13 27 31 
R 1 2 6 18 69 
| B | 15 
CP 1 2 3 4 5 
PU 120 120 120 120 120 
IPP 7 15 30 60 84 
R 1 4 13 40 69 
| B | 30 
CP 1 2 3 4 5 
PU 465 465 465 465 465 
IPP 29 58 116 232 328 
R 5 17 51 155 268 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Ask and bid prices obtained in a simulation. 
( s i , t k ) v s i βk,i ( t k , b j ) v 
b 
j 
αk,j 
( PU ′ , PU ) 10 .00 10 .00 ( PU, C 1 ) 20 .00 14 .67 
(R ′ 1 , R 1 ) 4 .00 4 .00 ( PU, C 2 ) 20 .00 16 .00 
(R ′ 2 , R 2 ) 3 .00 3 .00 ( PU, C 3 ) 20 .00 16 .00 
( IPP 1 , PU ) 9 .00 12 .67 ( PU, C 4 ) 20 .00 16 .00 
( IPP 1 , R 1 ) 9 .00 12 .67 ( PU, C 5 ) 20 .00 16 .00 
( IPP 1 , R 2 ) 9 .00 12 .67 ( PU, C 6 ) 20 .00 16 .00 
( IPP 2 , PU ) 8 .00 12 .00 ( PU, C 7 ) 20 .00 14 .67 
( IPP 2 , R 1 ) 8 .00 12 .00 ( PU, C 8 ) 20 .00 16 .00 
( IPP 2 , R 2 ) 8 .00 12 .00 ( PU, C 9 ) 20 .00 16 .00 
( PU, C 10 ) 20 .00 16 .00 
( t k , b j ) v b j αk,j ( t k , b j ) v 
b 
j 
αk,j 
( R 1 , C 1 ) 20 .00 14 .67 ( R 2 , C 1 ) 20 .00 14 .67 
( R 1 , C 2 ) 20 .00 16 .00 ( R 2 , C 3 ) 20 .00 16 .00 
( R 1 , C 4 ) 20 .00 16 .00 ( R 2 , C 5 ) 20 .00 16 .00 
( R 1 , C 7 ) 20 .00 14 .67 ( R 2 , C 6 ) 20 .00 16 .00 
( R 1 , C 9 ) 20 .00 16 .00 ( R 2 , C 7 ) 20 .00 14 .67 
( R 1 , C 10 ) 20 .00 16 .00 ( R 2 , C 8 ) 20 .00 16 .00 
Fig. 9. Determined trades on G . 
Table 5 
p 
(
t k , ( i, j ) 
)
and w i, j of each determined trade. 
Determined trade p ( t k , ( i, j )) w i, j d 
b 
j 
w i, j d 
b 
j 
R ′ 2 − R 2 −C 1 11 .67 17 1 17 
R ′ 1 − R 1 −C 2 12 .00 16 2 32 
R ′ 2 − R 2 −C 3 13 .00 17 3 51 
R ′ 1 − R 1 −C 4 12 .00 16 4 64 
IPP 1 − R 2 −C 5 3 .33 11 5 55 
IP P 2 − P U −C 6 4 .0 12 6 72 
IPP 2 − R 2 −C 7 2 .67 12 7 84 
IPP 1 − R 2 −C 8 3 .33 11 8 88 
P U ′ − P U −C 9 6 .00 10 9 90 
P U ′ − P U −C 10 6 .00 10 10 100 
W ( x t ) 653 
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s6.1. Conditions 
For conducting simulations of trade determination, a simula-
tion software for our model was developed with Java and lp_solve,
which is an integer programming solver. Simulation experiments
were conducted with the condition described in Table 2 . In the
simulations, we assumed that each consumer has the unique de-
mand of electricity. Hence, the index of each consumer is set as
the ﬁxed demand of the consumer since the index is unique to
each consumer. Since the model structure depends on prob ( R, C ),
100 times of iterations for every prob ( R, C ) and CP were conducted.
In deregulated electricity markets, newly joining participants
expands their capacity for electricity supply as the time elapses.
Hence, different types of capacity of newly joining participants
were set in the simulations. Table 3 shows Capacity Patterns (CP),
which are the conditions of capacity of each seller. CP 1 indicates
newly joining participants do not have large capacity because not
a long period has elapsed since the start of deregulation. In CP 2,
more periods of time have passed after the deregulation than CP 1,
and the difference of capacity between market participants became
smaller than CP 1. In CP 3, 4, and 5, newly joining participants got
more capacity as the index of CP increases. For all CP, capacity of
PU is equal to the total of all demands, and all consumer can pur-
chase electricity from PU as the worst choice. 
6.2. Results and discussion 
6.2.1. Determined electricity trades 
First, the result of one of the iterations is focused on to ex-
amine determined electricity trades. In this result, prob(R, C) = 0 . 3 ,
and CP 3 was selected. Table 4 represents ask and bid prices deter-
mined by Algorithm 1 . Regarding bid price βk, i , all bid prices wereore than valuation v s 
i 
. Hence, any trade with these bid prices
ives p s i ≥ 0 to s i . Moreover, all ask price αk, j were less than val-
ation v b 
j 
. Hence, any trade with these ask prices gives p b j ≥ 0
o b j . 
Based on the prices shown in Table 4 , Procedure 1 determined
lectricity trades x t . In Fig. 9 , solid arcs denote trades x t , and dot-
ed arcs show no electricity trades are conducted on the arcs.
able 5 shows p ( t k , ( i, j )) and trade value w i, j for each determined
rade. The ﬁrst column at Table 5 represents determined trades de-
cribed by the notation such as s i − t k − b j . Since p ( t k , ( i, j )) ≥ 0
or all t k , no-crossing trades were conducted in this simulation. In
erms of social welfare, W (x t ) = 653 . 0 , and W (x ) = 667 . 0 . There-
ore, ER (x t , x ) = 97 . 9% in this example. More detailed analysis on
R ( x t , x )% is presented in Section 6.2.2 . 
Table 6 shows PR of each participant in the simulation. As
hown in Table 6 , no participant obtains zero payoffs and acquires
 lot of payoffs exclusively. Allocation of PR of PU, IPP, and retail-
rs varied in each iteration since the number of trades that each
articipant involves in each iteration is not the same as other iter-
tions. In Section 6.2.3 , PR is examined in more detail with other
imulation conditions. 
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Table 6 
Payoff rate of each participant. 
Participant PR [%] Participant PR [%] 
C 1 0 .82 C 6 3 .68 
C 2 1 .23 C 7 5 .72 
C 3 1 .84 C 8 4 .90 
C 4 2 .45 C 9 5 .51 
C 5 3 .06 C 10 6 .13 
Participant PR [%] 
PU 21 .13 
R 1 11 .03 
R 2 17 .26 
IPP 1 7 .30 
IPP 2 7 .96 
Fig. 10. Average of eﬃciency rate (| S| = 5 , | B | = 10) . 
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d.2.2. Analysis regarding eﬃciency rate 
Our sequential solution method demonstrated high ER in the
imulation. Fig. 10 shows the average of ER ( x t , x ) in the simulation
ith the model in which | S| = 5 and | B | = 10 . In Fig. 10 , the hor-
zontal axis denotes prob ( R, C ), and the vertical axis corresponds
o the average of ER ( x t , x ) in the simulation. The average of ER ( x t ,
 ) was larger than 90% for all prob ( R, C ) and CP. This result shows
ur solution method can be used to determine eﬃcient trades of
 multi-unit commodity such as electricity. Since the model in
21] dealing with only a single-unit commodity, our model can be
sed for other types of markets compared to [21] . 
For all CP, the average of ER became small as prob ( R, C ) in-
reased. The reason for this decline might relate to the number of
ossible trades on G . If prob ( R, C ) is high, each trader has a larger
umber of possible trades on G . In this condition, however, de-
ands of traders concentrate on participants providing inexpensive
lectricity. Hence, our method determines trades satisfying all ca-Fig. 11. Payoff rate of each paacity and demand, and this determined trades demonstrates rela-
ively lower ER. 
In terms of CP except for CP 5, high ER was obtained when the
apacity of IPP and retailers is relatively lower than PU. On the
ther hand, ER became worse when the difference of capacity of
articipants became smaller. For CP 5, ER increased when prob ( R,
 ) ≥ 0.9. In CP 5, newly joining participants also have large capac-
ty similar to PU. Hence, many consumers could purchase inexpen-
ive electricity from newly joining participants in this condition. 
.2.3. Analysis regarding payoff rate 
The relation between payoff allocation and structure of market
etwork were examined by investigating PR of market participants.
irst, Fig. 11 shows simulation result about PR of each market par-
icipant for each CP. In Fig. 11 , the horizontal axis corresponds to
he name of each participant, and the vertical axis indicates PR of
ach participant. The parameters of G in this simulation were set
o | S| = 5 , | B | = 10 , and prob(R, C) = 0 . 5 . Large part of PR was ex-
lusively allocated to PU for CP 1. For CP 2, PR of the PU decreased,
nd PR of newly joining participants increased. Furthermore, for CP
, PR was fairly allocated to market participants compared to other
P. However, large part of PR was adversely allocated to retailers
or CP 4 and 5. Hence, if the valuation of market participants has
een ﬁxed to the same value, large part of PR is exclusively allo-
ated to retailers obtaining enough capacity to supply electricity. 
For examining the characteristics of PR with various structures
f G , the standard deviation of PR was analyzed. The standard de-
iation of PR indicates whether payoff allocation is fair or not. For
nstance, large standard deviation means payoff is not allocated to
articipants evenly. Fig. 12 indicates the standard deviation of PR
ith | S| = 5 . Each of Fig. 12 (a), (b), and (c) show the result with
he different setting of | B |. The horizontal axis denotes prob ( R, C ),
nd the vertical axis shows the average of the standard deviation
f PR in the 100 iterations. In terms of CP, Fig. 12 indicates simi-
ar characteristics found in Fig. 11 . The smallest standard deviation
as obtained with CP 3, and the standard deviation became high
ith CP 1 and CP 5. 
With regard to the axis denoting prob ( R, C ), the number of buy-
rs | B | affected variation of the standard deviation. In Fig. 12 (a), the
tandard deviation varies widely as prob ( R, C ) increases. The varia-
ion of the standard deviation in Fig. 12 (b) is smaller than that of
ig. 12 (a). Besides, the standard deviation of Fig. 12 (c) almost re-
ains stable. Hence, the dispersion of the standard deviation of PR
ill become stable if the number of buyers increases. 
The characteristics shown in Fig. 12 can also be found in Fig. 13 .
ince | S| = 7 in Fig. 13 , the number of sellers is larger than that
f Fig. 12 . The standard deviation in Fig. 13 is smaller than that
n Fig. 12 . These results also indicate that the variation of PR will
ecrease if there is a large number of sellers in the markets. rticipants with each CP. 
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Fig. 12. Standard deviation of payoff rate ( | S| = 5 ). 
Fig. 13. Standard deviation of payoff rate ( | S| = 7 ). 
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 7. Conclusion and future works 
This paper proposed a market model and a sequential solu-
tion method to determine eﬃcient electricity trades in deregu-
lated electricity markets. By conducting simulation experiments,
social welfare and payoff allocation on the electricity market model
were investigated. As a result, our sequential solution method de-
termined eﬃcient electricity trades even though the eﬃciency de-
pends on the structure of the markets and capacity of participants.
Furthermore, the results also indicated that the payoff allocation
for each market participant was affected by the period that have
elapsed since the start of the deregulation. 
To construct more realistic electricity market models, two kinds
of tasks are left as future works. First, simulation experiments
with various parameter conditions will reveal more interesting
characteristics of deregulated electricity markets. Experiments with
models containing a larger number of participants are especially
needed since this paper only dealt with small models. Second,
market participants are likely to decide their action in electricity
markets by considering payoff obtained in previous experiences.
Since our method cannot currently describe such kind of behav-
ior of participants, a method to deal with the dynamic behavior of
market participants should be integrated into our model. 
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